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Case: CV-2009-0008175-C Current Judge: Molly J Huskey

Wilfrido Duran Cuevas vs. Bernardino Flores Barraza Jr, etal.
Wilfrido Duran Cuevas vs. Bernardino Flores Barraza Jr, Liobaldo Garza

Other Claims
Judge

Date

81712009

New Case Filed-Other Claims

Gregory M Culet

Summons Issued (2)

Gregory M Culet

Filing: A - All initial civil case filings of any type not listed in categories B-H,
or the other A listings below Paid by: Rainey, Rebecca (attorney for
Cuevas, Wilfrido Duran) Receipt number: 0408896 Dated: 81712009
Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Cuevas, Wilfrido Duran (plaintiff)

Gregory M Culet

8/11/2009

Amended Summons Issued

Gregory M Culet

8/21/2009

Affidavit Of Service 8-16-09 (Bernardino

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit Of Service (8-12-09 Liobaldo

Gregory M Culet

Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or
petitioner Paid by: Ward, Robert Receipt number: 0413144 Dated:
812812009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr
(defendant)

Gregory M Culet

Answer-Bernardino Barraza

Gregory M Culet

91412009

Lis Pendens

Gregory M Culet

9/21/2009

Memorandum in Suppt of Pint's Motn for Summary Jdmt

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Rebecca A Rainey in Suppt of Pint's Motn for Summary Jdmt

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Wilfrido Cuevas in suppt of Pint's Motn for Summary Jdmt

Gregory M Culet

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (fax)

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Hearing Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 11-3-09
(fax)

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 11/03/2009 09:00 AM) pits motn for
summ judg

Gregory M Culet

Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Bernardino Barraza

Gregory M Culet

Objection and Motion to Strike

Gregory M Culet

Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Barraza's Objection and Motion to
Strike

Gregory M Culet

Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/03/2009 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Kim Saunders
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages pits motn for summ judg

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11/03/2009 09:00 AM: Hearing
Held pits motn for summ judg

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 11 /03/2009 09:00 AM: Motion
Denied - Motion to Strike

Gregory M Cu let

11/10/2009

Order Granting Pit Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

11/20/2009

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Telephone 01/28/2010 11 :00 AM) defs Gregory M Culet
motion reconsider

8/28/2009

912212009

10/21/2009

10/27/2009

11/3/2009

Amended Notice of Hearing 01/28/2010 (fax)

000001.

Gregory M Culet
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Wilfrido Duran Cuevas vs. Bernardino Flores Barraza Jr, etal.
Wilfrido Duran Cuevas vs. Bernardino Flores Barraza Jr, Liobaldo Garza

Other Claims
Judge

Date
Notice Of Hearing

Gregory M Culet

Motion to reconsider and claify order granting pltfs motion for sumamry
judgment (fax)

Gregory M Culet

Motion for leave to file amended answer and counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Hearing 01/28/2010

Gregory M Culet

12/7/2009

Mediation Order - Linda Copple-Trout

Gregory M Culet

12/16/2009

Stipulation for leave to file amended answer and counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

12/18/2009

Order for Leave to File Amended Answer & Counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

Amended Answer & Counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

1/8/2010

answer to def barraza's counterclaim (fax)

Gregory M Culet

1/21/2010

Wilfrido cuevas Memorandum in opposition to barraza's motion to
reconsider and/or clarify (fax)

Gregory M Culet

1/28/2010

Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 01/28/2010 11 :00 AM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages defs motion reconsider/ defs motn amend answer/counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 01/28/2010 11 :00 AM:
Hearing Held def s motion reconsider/ defs motn amend
answer/counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 01/28/2010 11 :00 AM:
Motion Denied defs motion reconsider/ defs motn amend
answer/counterclaim

Gregory M Culet

4/29/2010

Plaintiff/Counterdefendant's Request For Trial Setting

Gregory M Culet

5/14/2010

Notice Of Service (fax)

Gregory M Culet

5/26/2010

Response to Request for Trial Setting

Gregory M Culet

6/11/2010

Order Setting Case for Trial and Pretrial

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 12/07/2010 09:30 AM) 2 Day

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 10/12/2010 08:30 AM) Pretrial Conference

Gregory M Culet

7/9/2010

Stipulation re scheduling deadlines (fax)

Gregory M Culet

7/29/2010

Notice Of Service

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Service

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Service of Plaintiffs Answers and Responses to Defendant
Bernardino Barraza's Requests for Admission, First Set of lnterrogatires,
and Requests for Production of Documents

Gregory M Culet

Memorandum in support of Wilfredo Cuevas Second Mo for Summary
Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Wilfredo Cuevas Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Rebecca A Rainey in support of Wilfredo Cuevas Second
Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Hearing RE: Wilfrido Cuevas Second Motion for Sum Judgment
9-30-10

Gregory M Culet

11/20/2009

12/3/2009

8/31/2010
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Other Claims
Judge

Date
8/31/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 09/30/2010 09:00 AM) Sum
Judgment

Gregory M Culet

9/15/2010

Answering Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary
Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Robert Ward in Support of Defendant's Answering breif in
opposition to plaintiffs second motion for summary judgment

Gregory M Culet

9/16/2010

Objection and Motion to Strike

Gregory M Culet

9/22/2010

Notice of Available and Unavailable Dates for Hearing (fax)

Gregory M Culet

9/23/2010

Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 10/14/2010 01 :30 PM) Pretrial Conference

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/14/2010 01 :30 PM) Sum
Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Plaintiff's Opposition to defendant barrazas objection and motion to strike
(fax)

Gregory M Culet

Reply Memorandum in support of wilfrido cuevas second motion for
summary judgment (fax)

Gregory M Culet

Amended Notice of Hearing 10-14-10

Gregory M Culet

9/29/2010

Notice Of Service

Gregory M Culet

10/13/2010

statement of theory, witness and exhibit list and written statement

Gregory M Culet

10/14/2010

Hearing result for Court Trial held on 12/07/2010 09:30 AM: Hearing
Vacated 2 Day

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 10/14/2010 01 :30 PM: District Court
Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 10/14/2010 01:30 PM: Motion Held
Pretrial Conference & Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Pre Trial held on 10/14/2010 01 :30 PM: Motion
Granted-Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Application for entry of default

Gregory M Culet

Affidavit of Rebecca A Rainey in support of application for entry of default

Gregory M Culet

10/25/2010

Entry of Default and Order

Gregory M Culet

11/3/2010

Supplemental Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Second Motion for
Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

11/9/2010

Plaintiff's response to supplemental memorandum opposing second motion Gregory M Culet
for summary judgment (fax)

11/12/2010

Motion ro reconsider order granting motion for summary judgement

Gregory M Culet

Memorandum in support of motion to reconsider

Gregory M Culet

Notice Of Hearing 12-2-10

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 12/02/2010 09:00 AM) Bernardino
Barrazas motn to reconsider

Gregory M Culet

Directive

Gregory M Culet

10/19/2010

11/18/2010

11/22/2010
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Other Claims
Date

Judge

11/24/2010

Opposition to Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Plaintiffs Plaintiffs First Gregory M Culet
Motion for Summary Judgment (fax)

12/1/2010

Reply to Pltfs opposition to Motion to reconsider order granting Pltfs First
motion for summary Jmt

Gregory M Culet

12/2/2010

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/02/2010 09:00 AM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing held on 12/02/2010 09:00 AM: Motion
Held Bernardino Barrazas motn to reconsider

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Telephone 12/20/2010 08:30 AM)

Gregory M Culet

Order on Suppleental Argument RE Aummary Judgment and Motion for
Reconsideration

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Conference - Telephone held on 12/20/2010 08:30 AM:
Hearing Vacated

Gregory M Culet

Order granting Wilfrido Cuevas' Second Motion for Summary Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Judgment

Gregory M Culet

Civil Disposition entered for: Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr, Defendant;
Garza, Liobaldo, Defendant; Cuevas, Wilfrido Duran, Plaintiff. Filing date:
12/23/2010

Gregory M Culet

Case Status Changed: Closed

Gregory M Culet

Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs (fax)

Gregory M Culet

12/15/2010

12/16/2010

12/23/2010

1/5/2011

Affidavit of Mark C peterson in Support of Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs Gregory M Culet
(fax)
1/19/2011

Objection to Pltf s Memorandum of Costs (fax)

Gregory M Culet

1/27/2011

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Ward, Robert (attorney for Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr) Receipt
number: 0085763 Dated: 1/27/2011 Amount: $101.00 (Check) For:
Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr (defendant)

Gregory M Culet

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 85765 Dated 1/27/2011 for 100.00) for clerks Gregory M Culet
record
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk action

Gregory M Culet

Notice of Appeal

Gregory M Culet

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Gregory M Culet

Plaintiff/Respondents Request for Additional Transcripts

Gregory M Culet

Notice of Change of Firm and Address

Gregory M Cu let

4/1/2011

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 102542 Dated 4/1/2011 for 626.00)

Gregory M Culet

6/15/2011

Motion for Order Settling Costs (fax)

Gregory M Cu let

Notice Of Hearing on Motion for Order Settling Costs 6-30-11 (fax)

Gregory M Culet

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/30/2011 09:00 AM) pits motn for
order settling costs

Gregory M Culet

Stipulation to Appear telephonically for hearing on Pit Motion for Order
000004
settling Costs (fax
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2/10/2011

6/24/2011
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Other Claims
Judge

Date
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2011 03:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2011 03:00 PM:
Motion Held pits motn for order settling costs
Moving to 3pm by phone

Gregory M Culet

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2011 03:00 PM:
Motion Granted pits motn for order settling costs
Moving to 3pm by phone

Gregory M Culet

7/13/2011

Order Granting Settlement of Costs $576.30

Gregory M Culet

8/15/2011

Notice of Change of Firm and Address (fax)

Gregory M Culet

9/16/2011

Judgment on Costs $576.30 (favor of Plaintiff /Resp

Gregory M Culet

9/26/2011

Motion to Correct Clerical Mistake (fax

Gregory M Culet

10/21/2011

Amended Judgment of Costs $576.30

Gregory M Culet

11/8/2011

Bond Converted (Transaction number 8264 dated 11/8/2011 amount
100.00)

Gregory M Culet

Bond Converted (Transaction number 8265 dated 11/8/2011 amount
626.00)

Gregory M Culet

3/27/2012

Opinion (S C - Judgment Affirmed in Part/Vacated in Part & Remanded)

Gregory M Culet

6/6/2012

Remittitur

Gregory M Culet

6/11/2012

Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 07/05/2012 11:30 AM)

Molly J Huskey

Notice Of Hearing 7-5-12

Gregory M Culet

Change Assigned Judge

Molly J Huskey

6/30/2011

7/5/2012

Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 07/05/2012 11 :30 AM: Molly J Huskey
Hearing Held both attorney to appear by phone-Ward to set up
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Further Proceeding 09/17/2012 09:45 AM) Hearing
on briefing

Molly J Huskey

Motion for Summary Judgment - Pltf (fax

Molly J Huskey

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

Motion for Summary Judgment - Def (fax

Molly J Huskey

Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

8/17/2012

Reply in support of Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to
Barraza's Motion for Summary Judgment (fax

Molly J Huskey

9/13/2012

Amended Notice Of Hearing 10-3-12 (fax

Molly J Huskey

Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 10/03/2012 03:00 PM) Pit Mo sum
Judgment

Molly J Huskey

7/20/2012
8/9/2012
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Other Claims
Date

Judge

9/17/2012

Hearing result for Further Proceeding scheduled on 09/17/2012 09:45 AM: Molly J Huskey
Hearing Vacated Hearing on briefing

10/3/2012

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/03/2012 03:00 PM:
District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100
pages

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/03/2012 03:00 PM:
Hearing Held Pit Mo sum Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 10/03/2012 03:00 PM:
Motion Held Pit Mo sum Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Motion Granted Pit Mo sum Judgment-Pit to prepare order for Courts
signature

Molly J Huskey

10/15/2012

Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment

Molly J Huskey

11/26/2012

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid
by: Ward, Robert (attorney for Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr) Receipt
number: 0070309 Dated: 11/26/2012 Amount: $109.00 (Check) For:
Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr (defendant)

Molly J Huskey

Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 70313 Dated 11/26/2012 for 100.00)

Molly J Huskey

Notice of Appeal

Molly J Huskey

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Molly J Huskey

11/29/2012

S C - Order Augmenting Appeal

Molly J Huskey

12/7/2012

S C - Order Remanding to District Court

Molly J Huskey

12/12/2012

Judgment

Molly J Huskey

Civil Disposition entered for: Barraza, Bernardino Flores Jr, Defendant;
Garza, Liobaldo, Defendant; Cuevas, Wilfrido Duran, Plaintiff. Filing date:
12/12/2012 Plaintiffs Summary Judgment

Molly J Huskey
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO_F_

3

_,..,.ko-1: ~

Docket No. 38493

~

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,

)
)

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any),
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant,
and
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and
spouse (if any); DOES I THROUGH X,
UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS TO THE REAL
PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT
"A", COMMONLY KNOWN AS 29452
PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants.

MAR 2 7 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

)

v.

Boise, February 2012 Term
2012 Opinion No. 56

Filed: March 22, 2012
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
Canyon County. Honorable Gregory M. Culet, District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings.
Hall, Friedly & Ward, Mountain Home, for appellant.
Rebecca A Rainey, P.A., Boise, for respondent.

J. JONES, Justice.
This appeal involves a decade-long fight over title to a piece of real property. Juan Cuevas
allegedly agreed to sell the property to Bernardino Barraza in 200 I. However, after Barraza failed
to pay the purchase price, Juan filed a quiet title action against Barraza. Barraza defaulted. While
Barraza was seeking to set aside the default, Juan quitclaimed the property to his relative, Wilfrido

1
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DP.M,

Cuevas. Meanwhile, Barraza was successful in setting aside the default on appeal. On remand,
Juan defaulted and the district court quieted title in Barraza. Wilfrido then filed the present quiet
title action against Barraza, in which the district court found the default judgment against Juan void
and quieted title in Wilfrido. For the reasons outlined below, we agree that the default judgment
against Juan is void, but we vacate the summary judgment quieting title in Wilfrido as against
Barraza.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Juan Cuevas and Yrene Baez (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Juan") jointly held
title to real property commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road, Parma, Idaho, pursuant to a warranty
deed recorded in Canyon County on June 15, 1993. In March 2001, Juan allegedly executed a
written contract to sell the property to Bernardino Barraza and Liobaldo Garza (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Barraza") for a total purchase price of $80,000. 1
Barraza claims he paid a total of $22,635 toward the purchase, but then the agreement fell
apart. He asserts Juan agreed to repay him $20,000 upon resale of the property if he would vacate
the premises, which he did. Barraza claims Juan never repaid any money. In response, on May 6,
2002, Barraza recorded a claim of lien against the property, purportedly securing an "unpaid refund
in the amount $20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title."2
Wilfrido Cuevas claims he began purchasing the property under an oral agreement with
Juan in August of 2003. At that time he moved onto the property with his family, began making
improvements to it, started paying the property taxes on it, and began making payments to Juan
pursuant to the oral agreement.
On April 2, 2007, Juan filed a quiet title action against Barraza, seeking to clear his title of
Barraza's purported lien.

Barraza failed to respond, and the district court entered a default

judgment against him May 15, 2007, which was recorded May 17, 2007. On May 24, 2007,
Barraza moved to set aside the default judgment, attaching his proposed Answer and
Counterclaim-which included an affirmative request for the court to quiet title in his name-to
his attorney's affidavit in support of that motion.
1

The alleged contract constitutes two handwritten pages-one in English (the English Document), one in Spanish
(the Spanish Document). Because Baez' signature does not appear on the contract, the parties dispute whether she
was involved in this transaction.
2
The lien was re-recorded on January 31, 2007.

2

000008

Around June 13, 2007, Wilfrido claims he paid the remaining balance of the purchase price
to Juan pursuant to their oral contract, based on his understanding that Juan had successfully
quieted title. Juan executed a quitclaim deed transferring his interest to Wilfrido, and Wilfrido
claims he researched the Canyon County land records to ensure title was clear before recording it
on June 20, 2007. 3
On June 25, 2007, the district court denied Barraza's motion to set aside the default
judgment, and Barraza appealed. On June 25, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion
vacating the default judgment and remanding the case. Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 198
P.3d 740 (Ct. App. 2008). The Court of Appeals held that (1) Barraza's poor English and mistaken
belief that he was being represented by counsel constituted mistake or excusable neglect sufficient
to set aside the judgment, and (2) the proposed Answer and Counterclaim served with Barraza's
motion presented a meritorious breach of contract defense to the quiet title action. Id
Following issuance of the Court of Appeals opinion, Barraza recorded a !is pendens against
the property on August 6, 2008. On January 6, 2009, the Court of Appeals entered the Remittitur,
and on January 15, 2009, the district court granted Juan's attorney leave to withdraw. Although a
copy of the order granting leave to withdraw was mailed to Juan on January 23, 2009, Juan failed
to appear. The district court entered default judgment quieting title in Barraza on March 17, 2009,
and Barraza recorded the quiet title judgment on March 24, 2009.
After learning that he no longer held title to the property, Wilfrido filed a new suit against
Barraza to quiet title on August 7, 2009, and Barraza answered. Wilfrido moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the default judgment entered against Juan was void. The district court
granted that motion, ruling from the bench that (1) the judgment was void for lack of notice
because the Answer and Counterclaim was never properly filed or served on Juan and, (2)
alternatively, Wilfrido could collaterally attack the judgment notwithstanding the doctrine of res
judicata because he was not in privity with Juan.
3

Barraza claims that Wilfrido had several conversations with Barraza about the property and prior sale before Juan
initiated his quiet title action. According to Barraza: Wilfrido told Barraza that he knew about the prior transaction
but that Juan was planning to sell Wilfrido the property; Wilfrido called him to request copies of payments and
documents Barraza had regarding the prior transaction; Wilfrido told Barraza that Barraza should demand a refund
of his down payment from Juan so that Wilfrido could buy the property instead; and the two discussed retaining an
attorney to ensure that Juan was dealing with them both fairly. Apparently, communication between the two then
broke down. However, Wilfrido admits he was generally aware of the lawsuit and Barraza's recorded claim of lien.
At summary judgment, Barraza swore that Wilfrido knew at the time he recorded his quitclaim deed about Barraza's
claims on the property and, in fact, that was the reason Juan executed only a quitclaim deed.
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Following limited discovery, Wilfrido again moved for summary judgment, seeking to
quiet title in the property and arguing that Barraza did not have a viable unjust enrichment claim
against Wilfrido. The district court also granted this second motion, ruling from the bench that ( 1)
Barraza failed to establish a valid claim against the property, and (2) Barraza did not unjustly
enrich Wilfrido. The district court denied Barraza's motion to reconsider and entered judgment
quieting title in Wilfrido's name. Barraza timely appealed.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Did the district court err in ruling that Barraza's default judgment against Juan is void
or, alternatively, that the judgment is not precluded from attack by res judicata?

II.

Did the district court err in quieting title in Wilfrido free and clear of any interest
claimed by Barraza?

III.

Did the district court err in ruling that Barraza did not have a viable unjust enrichment
claim against Wilfrido?

IV.

Is either party entitled to attorney fees?

III.
DISCUSSION

A.

Standard of Review

"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court applies the
same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Mackay v. Four Rivers

Packing Co., 145 Idaho 408, 410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).

Summary judgment is

appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." l.R.C.P. 56(c). "[A]ll reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party," and
disputed facts will be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Mackay, 145 Idaho at
410, 179 P .3d at 1066. However, the nonmoving party cannot rely on mere speculation, and a
scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Van v. Portneuf

Med Center, 147 Idaho 552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009). This Court reviews questions of
law de novo. Martin v. Camas County ex rel. Bd o/Comm'rs, 150 Idaho 508, 511, 248 P.3d
1243, 1246 (2011).

4
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B.

The district court correctly found the prior default judgment against Juan to
be void for lack of notice.

In granting Wilfrido's first motion for summary judgment, the district court found the prior
default judgment quieting title in Barraza to be void because Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim
requesting that relief was never filed with the court nor served on Juan, except as an attachment to
his attorney's affidavit supporting the motion to set aside. On appeal, Barraza argues that the
Answer and Counterclaim was either (1) properly filed and served pursuant to I.R.C.P. 5 along
with the motion to set aside, or (2) deemed filed and served by virtue of the Court of Appeals'
references to, and reliance upon, it in the opinion. Wilfrido responds that simply attaching a
proposed pleading to an affidavit supporting a motion, even when the motion and affidavit are
properly filed and served, does not constitute filing and service of that pleading. Wilfrido also
argues that the Court of Appeals' decision could not operate to deem the Answer and Counterclaim
filed.
Generally, "final judgments, whether right or wrong, are not subject to collateral attack."
Kukuruza v. Kukuruza, 120 Idaho 630, 632, 818 P.2d 334, 336 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis
original). However, a void judgment can be attacked at any time by any person adversely affected
by it. Burns v. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 486, 65 P.3d 502, 508 (2003). This Court "narrowly
construe[s] what constitutes a void judgment." Hartman v. United Heritage Prop. & Cas. Co., 141
Idaho 193, 197, 108 P.3d 340, 344 (2005).
In order for a judgment to be void, there must generally ·be some
jurisdictional defect in the court's authority to enter the judgment, either because
the court lacks personal jurisdiction or because it lacks jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the suit. Puphal v. Puphal, 105 Idaho 302, 669 P.2d 191 (1983). A
judgment is also void where it is entered in violation of due process because the
party was not given notice and an opportunity to be heard. Prather v. Loyd, 86
Idaho 45, 382 P.2d 910 (1963) ...
Id (quoting McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 558, 82 P.3d 833, 840 (2003)). See also Meyers
v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 191, 221 P.3d 81, 89 (2009). Here, it appears that the district court
declared the judgment void because Juan was not given adequate notice of Barraza's affirmative
claim to quiet title, due to Barraza's failure to adhere to the I.R.C.P. 5 filing and service
requirements.
Rule 5(a) requires that "every pleading subsequent to the original complaint ... shall be
served upon each of the parties affected thereby." Further, Rule 5(d) states that "[a]11 papers after
5
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the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with the court either before service
or within a reasonable time thereafter." Finally, Rule 5(e)(l) provides that filing with the court
requires filing with the judge or clerk, at which point "[t]he judge or clerk shall indorse upon every
pleading and other paper the hour and minute of its filing."
Although this Court has not specifically addressed the issue, the Court of Appeals has held
that service and filing of a motion for leave to file a counterclaim, even where the proposed
counterclaim is attached, is not the equivalent of service and filing of the counterclaim itself.
Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 70, 995 P.2d 835, 840 (Ct. App. 2000). The Viafax
court reasoned:
As Viafax argues, receipt of the motion gave it notice only that it could object to a
counterclaim being filed and that the motion might be granted. It remained possible
that the court would deny the motion, even without an objection from Viafax, or
that Stuckenbrock would abandon the effort. Filing and service of the counterclaim
itself could be properly accomplished only after permission had been obtained from
the court. Such service was never performed.
In short, Viafax was never served with a pleading that it was obliged to answer in
order to avoid the risk of a default judgment.
Id (citations omitted).

Although the Viafax court was addressing a motion for relief from judgment under Rule
60(b )(4), which requires a showing of "surprise," the concept of "surprise" is virtually identical to
lack of notice. See id Thus, we find the same logic applies to the present case. The only time
Barraza presented the Answer and Counterclaim to Juan and the district court was as an attachment
to the affidavit in support of his motion to set aside the default judgment. It was not filed with the
clerk with its own file stamp pursuant to Rules 5(d) and (e)(l), or served on Juan pursuant to Rule
5(a). Thus, Juan only received notice that he could oppose the motion to set aside rather than notice
of an obligation to respond to the affirmative request for relief in Barraza's pleading.
The civil rules are designed to ensure that each party receives adequate notice and
opportunity to be heard. Compliance with Rule 5, in particular, goes to the heart of the notice
requirement, and we cannot find that Juan received due process where Barraza's responsive
pleading was not individually filed or served in compliance with that rule. Further, the Court of
Appeals decision to vacate the default judgment merely permitted Barraza to file and serve the
Answer and Counterclaim on Juan; it did not-nor could it-"deem" the pleading filed and served.

6
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Thus, the district court in the present case was correct that the prior default judgment against Juan
is void.
The parties also dispute the district court's alternative ruling that, even ifthe prior judgment
is not void, it is not precluded from attack by res judicata because Wilfrido is not Juan's privy.
However, because we agree that the prior judgment is void for lack of notice, we need not address
the propriety of the district court's alternative ruling.

C.

The district court erred in quieting Wilfrido's title on summary judgment
because Barraza demonstrated factual issues as to whether Wilfrido took title
subject to a statutory claim by Barraza.

Turning to Wilfrido's second motion for summary judgment, the district court held that
Barraza had failed to establish a legally valid claim against the property and therefore quieted title
in Wilfrido's name. According to the court, "If a lien is improperly filed as a mechanics lien and
the lien is not one otherwise recognized by law, then the lien is a nonconsensual common law lien
and is properly subject to a court order removing the lien, Idaho Code § 45-1703." Barraza argues
that he established a valid interest in the property and that Wilfrido had notice of his claim so he
cannot be a bona fide purchaser. Wilfrido responds that he is the presumptive owner of the
property by virtue of the quitclaim deed he received from Juan and that he took title to the property
free from any valid claim of Barraza. He asserts that Barraza was unable to show that he held a
valid, enforceable interest in the property prior to the recording of the deed.
While the parties spar back and forth over issues that are not particularly relevant-whether
the district court should have considered evidence of the oral contract between Juan and Wilfrido
to purchase the property, whether Barraza' s contract with Juan satisfied the statute of frauds, and
whether Barraza was entitled to specific performance of that contract4-the pertinent question is
whether Barraza presented competent evidence of a legally recognizable claim against the property
4

Although Barraza asserts he is entitled to specific performance of the contract he entered into with Juan in March
of 2001, the record discloses several seemingly insurmountable obstacles to such a claim. First and foremost, an
examination of Barraza's counterclaim fails to disclose a claim for specific performance. Even if he had alleged
such a claim, it is not readily apparent that the contract between the parties complies with the statute of frauds,
particularly the requirement that the contract must "either contain a sufficient description of the real property or refer
to an external record containing a sufficient property description." Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d
1174, 1178 (2009). Neither the Spanish Document nor the English Document contains a legal description of the
property. The Spanish Document ends with words translated as, "We need the Ranch's address." The English
Document merely describes the ranch as "29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, ID 83660." There are a number of other
potential infirmities, such as the lack of Baez' signature on either version of the contract, unclear payment terms,
potential application of )aches, and no showing that Barraza made a tender of the balance of the purchase price,
among other things. Suffice it to say that this is simply not a viable claim and need not be dealt with further here.

7
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so as to withstand summary judgment. The record clearly discloses genuine issues of material

fac~

as to whether Barraza asserted a legally recognized lien against the property and, if so, whether
Wilfrido took subject to that lien.
Although Barraza does not specifically identify his claim against the property as a
"vendee's lien," his claim certainly appears to fit the elements of that type of statutory lien. A
vendee' s lien is described in LC. § 45-804, as follows:
One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property, independent of
possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover back,
in case of a failure of consideration.
In his claim oflien, which was recorded twice-May 6, 2002, and January 31, 2007-before the
quitclaim deed from Juan to Wilfrido, Barraza asserted a lien for "unpaid refund in the amount of
$20,000.00 for the payments on Real estate Title." The lien claim attached and incorporated a
valid legal description of the property. We recently held in Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank No. 37814,
152 Idaho 215, _ , 268 P.3d 1167, 1175 (2012), that "it is the payment to the owner of any part of
the purchase price of the real property under an agreement of sale that creates the lien." Barraza' s
claim of lien indicates that the $20,000 payment had been made on or before January 5, 2002, so
presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date. It should be noted that the lien is
created upon the payment of any part of the purchase price and is not dependent upon the recording
of a written document. The claim of lien filed by Barraza in this case does, however, constitute
evidence bearing on the question of what notice may have been imparted to subsequent purchasers
of the property.
Besides asserting that Barraza established no credible claim against the property, Wilfrido
asserts that he was a bona fide purchaser. The pertinent statute is LC. § 45-803, which provides,
"The liens of vendors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one claiming under
the debtor, except a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for value." In Benz we held that
"good faith," as used in this statute, means without "actual or constructive knowledge of the
applicable lien." Id. at_, 268 P.3d at 1180. Barraza asserts in his affidavit that Juan was aware
of the $20,000 claim he asserted against the property and that Juan knew it was money that had
been paid toward the purchase price of the property. In an affidavit, Wilfrido acknowledged that
he was aware Juan had brought a suit against Barraza "because of a $20,000 claim of lien that was
filed against the property." Certainly, the recording and re-recording of the written claim of lien
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would have put Wilfrido on notice of Barraza's claim. Wilfrido may have questioned the validity
of the claim, but he certainly was aware of it and therefore could not be a good faith purchaser
under LC. § 45-803.
This is not to say that Wilfrido may not have defenses against Barraza's claim. We do not
opine on that issue, as it has not been presented on appeal. What is apparent is that the district
court erred in quieting title in favor of Wilfrido as against Barraza because genuine issues of fact
existed as to whether or not Barraza had asserted a legitimate claim against the property. The
district court erred in determining that Barraza's claim of lien was not authorized by statute and
"constitutes a nonconsensual common law lien, and is invalid and unenforceable," citing LC. § 451702. A vendee' s lien is authorized by statute and, therefore, does not fit the description of a
nonconsensual lien. Barraza presented sufficient evidence of a vendee's lien to survive summary
judgment. The judgment, insofar as it quiets title in Wilfi:ido against Barraza, is vacated and the
case is remanded to determine the issue of Barraza' s rights, if any, under LC. § 45-803.

D.

The district court correctly ruled that Barraza did not have a viable unjust
enrichment claim against Wilfrido.

The district court summarily dismissed Barraza's unjust enrichment claim against Wilfi:ido.
On appeal, Barraza argues that his improvements and down payment on the property unjustly
enriched Wilfi:ido. Wilfrido argues that those items, even if causing incidental benefit to Wilfrido,
were not intended for Wilfi:ido.
A claim for unjust enrichment requires "that (I) a benefit is conferred on the defendant by
the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and (3) it would be inequitable for the
defendant to accept the benefit without payment of the value of the benefit."

Teton Peaks

Investment Co. v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394, 398, 195 P.3d 1207, 1211 (2008). However, the alleged
recipient must also be the intended beneficiary. Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 471, 886
P.2d 772, 776 (1994). Accordingly, "[r]ecovery for unjust enrichment is unavailable if the benefits
[to the recipient] were created incidentally by [the claimant] in pursuit of his own financial
advantage." Id
As Wilfrido argues, while Barraza alleged he made improvements to the property, and that
his down payment somehow reduced Wilfi:ido's purchase price, he failed to demonstrate that either
the improvements or the money were intended to benefit Wilfi:ido. Indeed, Barraza makes no
assertion that those benefits were created for any other purpose than his own financial gain, and
they only incidentally benefited Wilfi:ido, if at all. Thus, the district court correctly dismissed
9
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Barraza's unjust enrichment claim on summary judgment.
E.

Neither party is entitled to attorney fees.

Both parties argue for attorney fees on appeal. Barraza argues for fees under LC. §§ 12120 and -121. Wilfrido not only seeks attorney fees under LC.§ 12-121, but also sanctions under
I.AR. 11.2. However, because there was no contract or commercial transaction between Wilfrido
and Barraza, and because Barraza did not bring a frivolous appeal, we find no basis to award fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the district court's judgment finding Barraza's
prior default judgment against Juan void for lack of notice. However, we vacate the district
court's quiet title judgment against Barraza. We remand for further proceedings with regard to
the vendee's lien issue. We decline to award costs or attorney fees to either party.

Chief Justice BURDICK, and Justices EISMANN, W. JONES and HORTON CONCUR.
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WILFRJDO CUEVAS,

)
)
)
)
)

P laintiff-CounterdefendantRespondent,

v.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual and spouse))
(if any),
)
Defendant-CounterclaimantAppellant,
and

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

REMITTITUR
Supreme Court Docket No. 38493
Canyon County Court# 2009-8175

)
)
)
)
)

LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and spouse (if )
any); DOES I THROUGH X, UNKNOWN )
CLAIMANTS TO THE REAL PROPERTY
DESCRIBED IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY ~
KNOWN AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, )
IDAHO.
)
)
Defendants.

TO:

THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CANYON.

The Court having announced its Opinion in this cause March 22, 2012, and

d.:,...,.

having denied Respondent's Petition for Rehearing on June __t:, 2012; therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with
the directive of the Opinion, if any action is required.
DATED this

4f:: day of June, 2012.

8{-r:fhvi ~lffl-'
Clerk of the SupreITMCOurt
STATE OF IDAHO
cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Judge
Publisher( s)
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JUL 2 0 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K CANO. DEPUTY

Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
Amy A. Lombardo, ISB No. 8646
RAINEY LAW OFFICE

910 West Main Street, Suite 258
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone (208) 258-2061
Facsimile (208) 473-2952

rar@raineylawoffice.com
aal@raineylawoffice.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRJDO CUEVAS, an individual,
Case No. CV 09-8175
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

vs.

JUDGMENT

BERt"\JARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et
al.

Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas, by and through its counsel of record, Rainey
Law Office, and hereby moves this court, pursuant to Rule 56(c) Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
for entry of summary judgment, on the grounds that any potential vendee's lien claimed by
defendant Bernardino Barraza is barred by the statute of limitations. This Motion is supported

by a memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith.
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Oral Argument is requested.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2012.

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

Rebecca A. Rainey- of the

Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of July 2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the method
indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 E. 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
~Facsimile
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Rebecca A. Rainey, ISB No. 7525
Amy A. Lombardo, ISB No. 8646

JUL 2 0 2012

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

910 West Main Street, Suite 258
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone (208) 258-2061
Facsimile (208) 473-2952
rar@raineylawoffice.com
aal@raineylawoffice.com

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
K CANO, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN IBE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

Case No. CV 09-8175
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et
al.
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Wil:frido Cuevas ("Wil:frido"), by and through his attorney of
record, Rainey Law Office, and hereby files this memorandum in support of his motion for
summary judgment:

I.

INTRODUCTION

This case involves a dispute over property in Parma, Idaho, that has been in litigation for
more than five years and involved two lawsuits.

It now comes back to this Court on remand

from the Supreme Court of Idaho. The only issue left to determine is whether Bernardino
Barraza ("Barraza") has a valid and enforceable vendee's lien, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 45-803.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1
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Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 9 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Assuming, arguendo, that a
vendee's lien exists, the statute oflimitations bars Barraza from enforcing such lien.

II.

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1

1. Barraza made a payment on or before January 5, 2002. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493,
slip op. at 8 (Idaho March22, 2012).2
2. Barraza filed a claim of lien on May 6, 2002.

3

3. Wilfrido filed suit to quiet title on August 7, 2009. See Register of Action.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file, and
affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. McGilvray v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 39, 46,
28 P.3d 380, 387 (2001).

The facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. Brown v. Caldwell School Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 115, 898 P.2d 43, 46
(1995). "I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations in the
pleadings, but must set forth by affidavit specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial."

Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.2d 172, 175 (2007).

If the

nonmoving party fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an
essential element to that party's case, Rule 56, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, mandates entry of

1

The Supreme Court opinion states, "Barraza's claim of lien indicates that the $20,000 payment bad been made on
or before January 5, 2002, so presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date. It should be noted that
the lien is cI"eated upon the payment of any part of the purchase price and is not dependent upon the recording of a
written document."
2
Williido accepts and adopts as written all facts addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in its decision, for purposes
of this Motion for Summary Judgment only, and incotporates the same herein.
3
The same was recorded again on January 31, 2007.
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summary judgment. Sparks v. St. Luke's Reg'l Med Ctr. Ltd., 115 Idaho 505, 509, 768 P.2d
768, 772 (1988).

IV.
A.

ARGUME1''T

Summarv Judgment is appropriate because any vendee's lien is time barred.
The statute of limitations bars Barraza from enforcing a vendee's lien as a matter oflaw.

Idaho Code§ 45-804 establishes a vendee's lien:
45-804. Lien of purchaser of real property. One who pays to the
owner any part of the price of real property, under an agreement
for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the property,
independent of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he
may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of
consideration.
Assuming, arguendo,4 that a vendee's lien does exist, such lien is barred by any possible statute
of limitations that might apply. While no Idaho court of appellate review has decided what
limitations period applies to a vendee's lien, because there were more than seven years between
the filing ofBarraza's claim of lien and the commencement of this action, there is no limitations
period long enough under Idaho law to save the alleged claim of lien.
Of all potential limitations periods that might apply two stand out as potentially
appropriate: (1) the three-year limitations period for an action upon a liability created by statute,
Idaho Code § 5-218(1), or (2) a limitations period ..borrowed" from the underlying obligation.

See Blankenship v. Myers, 97 Idaho 356, 371, 544 P.2d 314, 329 (1975); Rogers v. Crockett, 41
Idaho 336, 344, 238 P. 894, 896 (1925) (each noting that a vendor's lien can be enforced against
a vendee only so long as an action can still be brought against the buyer for the unpaid purchase

4

Critically, in this matter the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's conclusion that there was not a
valid agreement by and between Barraza and Juan Cuevas for the sale of the Property. In the concurring opinion of
Shepherdv. Dougan, 58 Idaho 543, 76 P.2d 442 (1937), it was noted that a vendee's lien cannot exist absent a valid
agreement for the sale of property, although that issue has not been squarely presented to any Idaho court of
appellate review.
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price). In this case, the District Court concluded and the Supreme Court affmned Wilfrido's
arguments that any and all claims that Barraza attempted to bring were invalid and.for
unenforceable.

Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 5-9 (Idaho March 22, 2012).

Accordingly, there is no possible claim underlying Barraza's alleged vendee's lien from which a
limitation may be borrm.ved.
The Supreme Court also noted that the undisputed facts show when a vendee's lien (if
any) would have been created: '<the $20,000 payment had been made on or before January 5,
2002, so presumably the statutory lien attached at or prior to that date." Cuevas v. Barraza, No.
38493, slip op. at 8 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Accordingly, in order to enforce the vendee's lien,
suit would have had to commence on or before January 5, 2005. The present action was not filed

until August 7, 2009; the former action (between Juan Cuevas and Barraza) was filed on April 2,
2007. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 2 (Idaho March 22, 2012). There simply was
not an action filed within any limitations period that could apply to the claim of a vendee's lien.
Accordingly, summary judgment disposing of the single issue remaining in this case is
appropriate.
B.

The Supreme Court's decision affirms the District Court's judgment in all other
respects and no other issues remain to be decided.
Previously, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Wil:frido on two

separate summary judgment motions. On the first motion, the District Court ruled that a prior

default judgment quieting title in Barraza was void and that res judicata did not bar Wilfrido
from collaterally attacking such judgment. Id. at 3. On the second motion, the District Court
quieted title in Wilfrido on the grounds that Barraza had not established a valid claim. The
District Court also rejected Barraza's unjust enrichment claim. Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493,

slip op. at 4 (Idaho March 22, 2012).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed each and every claim that was raised by the
parties and decided by the District Court. The only matter remaining on remand is whether the

judgment quieting title was improper because of a previously unspecified vendee's lien. The
Supreme Court noted that: "[a]lthough Barraza does not specifically identify his claim against
the property as a 'vendee's lien,' his claim certainly appears to fit the elements of that type of
statutory lien." Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 8 (Idaho March 22, 2012).

As

discussed above, if a vendee's lien existed, any applicable statute of limitations has run and,
therefore, bars any such lien claim.

V.

CONCLUSION

As the foregoing demonstrates, the statute of limitations bars any claim of "vendee's
lien" that Barraza might have and there are no other issues for this Court to address on remand.
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate, and title to the Property should be quieted in
Wilfrido's name.
DATED this 20th day of July, 2012.

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

Attorney for Plaintiff
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COMES NOW Defendant, Bernardino

Barraza~

by and through his attorney of

record, Robert Ward, of the finn Hall, Friedly & Ward, and pursuant to Rule 56, Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure; moves this Court for summary judgment that Defendant,

Bernardino Barraza, has a $20,000.00 vendee's lien. against the real property and that
Plaintiff, Wilfrido Cuevas, should pay Defendant, Bernardino Barrw..a, the $20,000.00 or
the property should be sold by the sheriff to satisfy the lien.
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on record in this matter, and the

Memorandtim in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith.
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK
KCANO, DEPUTY

IN THE DI.STRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CV09-8175

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,
Plaintiff,

vs.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LlOBALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA,• IDAHO,• :f

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

I
I

Defendants.

'

The above-named defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, Hall, Friedly &

Ward, submits this memorandum in support of the defendant Bernardino Barraza's Motion for
Summary Judgment and in opposition to the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS

Thls case is on remand from the Supreme Court ofidaho who ovcitumed the granting of
the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment by the district judge~ finding that there was

sufficient evidence to support a claim by Bemardino Barraw for a vendee's lien against the real
property. See Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012).

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF BERNARDINO BARRAZA 'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND TN OPPOSlTrON tO PLAlNTIFP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY .ll.JDGMENT- l

000028

PAGE

HALL FRIEDLY WARD

Ll:'.Ji:l::Ji:l 13144

II.

05/12

FACTS

All facts refel:red to in this memorandum are folUld in the Facts and Procedural section of

Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337 (2012), and in the affidavits and pleadings on
file with this court.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery
documents before the court indicate that no genuine issue of matelial fact exists
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Idaho R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Baxter; 135 Idaho at 170, J6 P.3d at 267. TI1e moving party carries the
burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Baxter, 135
Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267.
In construing the record on a motion for summary judgment, all reasonable
inferences and conclusions must be drawn in favor of the party opposing
swnmary judgment Student Loan Fund of Idaho, Inc. v. Duerner, 131 Idaho 45,
49, 951 P.2d 1272~ 1276 (1997). The nonmoving party, however, ''may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleadings~ but the party's
response, by affidavits or ... othe1wise ... ,must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for triaJ.'' Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at
170~ 16 P.3d at 267. '~A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
genuine issue of fact," but circumstantial evidence may suffice. Tingley v.
Harrison, 125 Idaho 86:- 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110
Idaho 466, 470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986), Still, the evidence offered in support
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must be admissible.
Bromley v. Garey, 132 ldaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169 (1999).

Banner Life .lns. Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 147 Idaho

117~

123; 206 P.3d

481, 487 (2009).

IV.

ISSUES

1.

Whether Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the real property.

2.

Whether the statute of limitations bars Bernardino Barraza from enforcing

the lien.
V.

1.

ARGUMENT

Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien on the real property and his vendee's
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lien is fully enforceable against the plaintiff.
In 1887, the territorial legislature created statutory vendor's and ven.dee's liens,

which are now codified as Idaho Code sections 45-801and45-804 ....
Section 45-804 states,

One who pays to the owner any part of the price of real property, under an
agreement for the sale thereof, has a special Hen upon the property, independent
of possession, for such part of the amount paid as he may be entitled to recover
hack, in case of a failure of consideration.

In 1&87,, the territorial legislature also enacted what is now codified as Idaho Code
section. 45-803, which states:
The liens of ve11dors and purchasers of real property are valid against every one
claiming under the debtor, except a purchaser or en.cum.brancer in good faith and
for value.

Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167, 1177 (2012).
Bernardino Barraza clearly has a vendee's lien. Bernardino Barraza had an. agreement
with Juan Cuevas to purchase the real property which is the subject of this litigation. Bernardino
Barraza paid to Juan. Cuevas over $20,000.00 toward the purchase of the property and occupied

the real property. Juan Cuevas later approached Bernardino Barraza and requested him to vacate
the property and said that if Bernardino Barraza would vacate the property, Juan Cuevas would

refund to him the $20,000.00 down payment once the real property was sold to another
purchaser. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152 ldaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 339 (2012). Bemardino Barraza
vacated the property and filed a lien to notify the world that he had an interest in the property "in
the amount of $20,000.00 for the payments on Real Estate Title.': Id. Juan Cuevas filed a Quiet
Title Action on April 2, 2007, to remove the lien that Bernardino Barra7..a filed. Id At no time
prior to the Quiet Title Action did Juan Cuevas deed the real property or record any transfer of
owi1ership to the property. Id. See also the affidavits of the parties on file with the court.
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This clearly created a vendee's lien in favor of Bernardino Barraza on the real property.
The c.onsideration of the agreement, the transfer of the real property to Bernardino Barraza by

Juan Cuevas) failed because Juan Cuevas failed to transfer the property or refund the $20,000.00
as promised. Bernardino Barrv,a could not technically collect the $20,000.00 from Juan Cuevas
until Juan Cuevas had re-sold the property as the parties agreed, but this did not lessen
Bernardino Barraza's interest or claim in the real property.
Therefore, Bernardino Barraza was acting well within in his rights to notify the world by
recording his lien, but he could not enforce the lien until Juan Cuevas failed to refund the
$20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza. Moreover, the vendee's lien is valid against the plaintiff
because he was not a purchaser in good faith, and the plaintiff was specifically held by the
Supreme Court ofldaho to have actual knowledge of Bernardino Barra:za's lien/claim. See

Cuevas v. Barraza. 152 Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012).
For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza had a vendee's lien on the real
prope.rty and the lien was valid against the plaintiff.
2.

The statute oflimitations has not run on the vendee's lien because the statute

of I.imitations on Bernardino Barraza's underlying claim for failure of
considerationfbreacb of contract by Juan Cuevas has not run.

The Supreme Coul1 ofldaho established in Blankenship v. Myers, the rule for
detennining th.e statute of limitations on a vendor~s lien, which would apply to the vendee's lien

that is established by the same statute. The Supreme Court stated:
The vendor's lien is a Hen created by statute, J.C. § 45·801, to protect the
unsecured seller of real property by giving him rights in the property sold, subject
to the rights of a good faith purchaser for value as provided in J.C. § 45 803,
when he has no other collateral to secure payment for the property. This statutory
lien codified the comm011 law rule which established a vendor's lien under similar
circU1l'.lstances. At common law the vendor's lien generally could be enforced
4
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against the ve11dee as long as the vendor could still bring an. action against the
buyer for the unpaid purchac;e ptice. See 77 Am.Jur.2d, Vendor & Purchaser, s
462, p. 588 (1975). An action for enforcement of a vendor 1 s lien and an action for
the unpaid purchase price are so interrelated that it is reasonable to conclude that
the legislature intended that the statute of limitations for the lien claim would run
only when the statute of limitati.ons runs to bar the claim for the debt. We adopt
the following language of the Supreme Court of California in the case of Finnell
v. Finnell, 156 Cal. 589, 105 P. 740 (1909), in which the California court, which
construed a vendor's lien statute substantially identical to Idaho's, stated:

'111e right of a vendor to enforce his lien continues, unless waived, so long as an
action can be commenced for the purchase money ... .' 105 P. at 744 .
. . . We conclude that as long as the claim is n.ot barred, the lien is not barred.
Blankenship v. J.1yers, 97 Idaho 356, 370-71, 544 P.2d 314, 328-29 (1975). Therefore, following
the Jogic of the Supreme Court in Blankenship the statute of limitations on the vendee' s lien in
this matter is enforceable so long as the statute of limitations on Bernardino Barraza's claim for
the $20,000.00 has not run.
The statute of limitations for a written cont.Tact in Idaho is five years. I.C. § 5-216. The
statute of limitations on an oral contract in Idaho is four years. I.C. § 5~217. Bernardino
Barraza' s claim arises from a written contract with Juan Cuevas for the purchase of the real
property at issue in this litigation. The contract was subsequently modified by the parties when
Juan Cuevas told Bernardino Barraza that if he vacated the real property, Juan Cuevas would
refund $20,000.00 to Bernardino Barraza. when Juan Cuevas sold the property to another party.
The underlying contract was in writing, but the modification was oral. Because Bernardino
Barraza's claim was based upon a Virritten contract, the statute oflim.itations should be five years,
but even if a court determines that because the modification to the contract was oral, Bernardino
Barraza' s claims are based upon ·an oral contract, the statute of limitations to pursue Bernardino
Barraza's claim is fm1r years.
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Regardless of whether the statute of limitations is four or five years, the statute of
limitations has not expired in either event. The statute of limitations for a breach of contract does
not began to nm until the time of the breach. This issue was addressed very clearly in the
previous Cuevas v. Barraza ~y the Court of Appeals.
A cause of action for breach of contract accrues upon breach for limitations
purposes. See Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 830, 11 P.3d 20 1 26 (2000);
Skaggs v. Jensen, 94 Idaho 179, 180) 484 P.2d 728, 729 (1971). The five-year
statute oflimitation for Barraza to bring this breach of contract claim began to run
when Barra?...a became aware of the breach. The breach alleged in Barraza's
answer occun·ed when Cuevas filed the instant quiet title action-April 2, 2007.

Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 517, 198 P.3d 740, 746 (Ct. App. 2008). "The instant quiet
title action1' referred to by the Court of Appeals was the quiet title action that Juan Cuevas filed
against Bernardino Barraza rather than selling the property to a third party and paying
Bernardino Barraza the $20,000.00 that Juan Cuevas owed to Bernardino Barra?.,a.
Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until April 7, 2007. The plaintiff
in this action filed his quiet title action on August 7, 2009. Bernardino Barraza timely filed his

Answer, and filed an Amended Answer and Counterclaim on 12/18/2009. See Register of
Action. Therefore, without taking into consideration whether the time that the first Cuevas v

Barraza was up on appeal~ and the time that Bernardino Barraza was the owner of title of the real
property, tolled the statute of limitations, Bernardino Barraza preserved his claim by timely filing
his Amcn.ded Answer and Counterclaim.
The plaintiff may argue that Bernai-di110 Barraza did not allege in his Amended Answer
and Counterclaim that he had a vendee's lien. However, this is irrelevant because Bernardino
Barraza did set forth in his Amended Answer and Counterclaim all of the conduct, transactions~
or occurrences that comprise the claim of a vendee's lien. Indeed! it was from these very

aHegations that Bernardino Barraza set forth and the Supreme Court held that there was
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF BERNARDlNO BARRAZA'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY ruooMENT
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sufficient evidence of a vendee' s lien to sttrvive summary judgment. Cuevas v. Barraza, 152
Idaho 890, 277 P.3d 337, 343 (2012). Indeed, that is why this case was remanded. Because the
Supreme Court ofidaho set aside Bernardino Barraza's quiet title judgment as owner of the
property, and held that he has a vendee's lien instead, Bernardino Barraza may, if necessary,
am.end his pleadings by leave of the court to include his claim for the vendee's lien and to
foreclose 011 the vendee' s lien, and those claims would relate back to the date of Bernardino
Barraza's Answer and Counterclaim for purposes of the statute of limitations. Rule 15(c) of the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states:
Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the am.endment relates back to
the date of the original pleading.
Tl1erefore, the statute of 1imitatio11s has not run because Bernardino Barraza filed his claim with
the court well within the four or five year statute of limitations.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons stated above, Bernardino Barraza has a vendee's lien against the
real pi:operty at issue in this case. The lien is not barred by the statute oflimitations, and this
Court should deny the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and grant Bernardino Barraza's
Motion for Summary Judgment and find as a matter of law that Bernardino Barraza has a
$20,000.00 lien against the real property and that the plaintiff should pay to Bernardino Barra?.a
the $20,000.00 or grant the sale of the real property by the sheriff to satisfy the Hen.

DATED this

q lit...day of t2vu) J.

_ , 2012.

H~&WARD

~

By
ROBERT WARD
Attorney for Bernardino Barraza
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T. CRAWFORD, DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CAA'YON
WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,
Case No. CV 09-8175

Plaintiff,

vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et
al.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
OPPOSITION TO BARRAZA'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendant.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Wilfrido"), by and through his attorney of

record, Rainey Law Office, submits this reply brief in support of his motion for summary
judgment, and in opposition to Barraza' s motion for summary judgment, and states as follows:
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court to detennine a single issue: what
rights, if any, does Barraza have under a vendee's lien theory under Idaho Code § 45-803. In
accordance vvith this Court's briefing schedule, Wilfrido moved for summary judgment arguing
that if any vendee' s lien ever did exist, the statute of limitation bars Barraza from enforcing such
lien. In opposition, Barraza asserts that the limitations period for enforcing such lien does not

run until the limitations period for the underlying contract action that gives rise to the vendee's
lien begins to run. This argument highlights the fi.mdamental flaw in Barraza's vendee's lien
theory: there was not a valid contract underlying Barraza's alleged vendee's lien. Because there
is not an underlying contract, there cannot be a vendee's lien. To recognize a vendee's lien
under the undisputed facts of this case would wholly circumvent the statute of frauds.

II.

ARGUMENT

A. Barraza does not have a vendee' s lien.
The Supreme Court remanded this case for a determination of whether Barraza had a
vendee's lien under Idaho Code Section 45-804, which provides:
One who pays to the mvner any part of the price of real property,
under an agreement for the sale thereof, has a special lien upon the
property, jndependent of possession, for such part of the amount
paid as he may be entitled to recover back, in case of a failure of
consideration.
This statutory section requires three things for a vendees lien to exist: (i) payment of a portion of
the purchase price for real property by the vendee to the vendor, (ii) such payment is made
"under an agreement for the sale [of the real property]"; and (iii) a failure of consideration: i.e.,
the real property is not conveyed in accordance with the agreement for sale.
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No Idaho court of appellate review has directly addressed the question of whether an
invalid and unenforceable agreement for the sale of real property is sufficient to give rise to a
vendee's lien. However, in the case of Shepherd v. Dougan, (ultimately decided on a resulting
trust theory), Justice Ailshie's dissenting opinion for rehearing and modification makes a
compelling argument that the "agreement" contemplated by Idaho Code Section 45-804 must be
a valid, enforceable agreement.
As I read and understand this statute, it is intended to apply to
cases of contract for the purchase of real property and is meant to
protect the vendee, where he makes a payment on an agreed
purchase price; and for some reason or other the vendor either is
unable to give a title or refuses to comply with his agreement to do
so, and the consideration for the contract fails.

58 Idaho 543, 564, 76 P.2d 442, 450 (1937).
A contract for sale or a deed, which are absolutely void from the
beginning because of the fact that the vendor is entirely lacking in
power and authority to transfer the premises, cannot be the
foundation for a vendee's lien any more than they could be the
foundation for any other legal or equitable interest in the premises.

Id. at 567, 76 P.2d at 452 (quoting O'Neill v. Bennett, 49 S.D. 524, 207 N.W. 453) (italics
omitted). The principles espoused by Justice Ailshie should be adopted by this Court: a void,
invalid, and unenforceable contract is not the type of "agreemenf' contemplated by Idaho Code
Section 45-508 and cannot, therefore, serve the basis of a vendee's lien.

In this matter, it has been established that Barraza did not have a valid and enforceable
contract for the purchase of the property that would satisfy the second requirement of Idaho
Code Section 45-508. This Court previously held that the alleged contract by and between
Barraza and Juan Cuevas was void and unenforceable because it did not comply with the statute
of frauds. Tr. Vol. I, p. 96, L. 22 - p. 97, L. 10. (attached. hereto as Appendix A for the Court's
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convenience). The Idaho Supreme Court strongly indicate<l that it agreed with this Court's prior
conclusion in that regard:
[I]t is not readily apparent that the contract between the parties
complies \\lith the statute of frauds, particularly the requirement
that the contract must 'either contain a sufficient description of the
real property or refer to an external record containing a sufficient
property description.' Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 629, 200
P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009). Neither the Spanish Document nor the
English Document contains a legal description of the property. The
Spanish Document ends 'A'i.th words translate<l as, 'We need the
Ranch's address.' The English Document merely describes the
ranch as "29452 Pearl Rd., Parma, ID 83660.' There are a number
of other potential infirmities, such as the lack of Baez' signature on
either version of the contract, unclear payment terms, potential
application of laches, and no showing that Barraza made a tender
of the balance of the purchase price, among other things.
Cuevas v. Barraza, No. 38493, slip op. at 7, n. 4 (Idaho March 22, 2012). Indeed, all of
Barraza' s references to the Supreme Court's opinion for the proposition that an
"agreement" or "contract" existed overstate the Supreme Court's position, as those
references more accurately referred to an "alleged agreement" or "alleged contract."
Because Barraza cannot establish that he had a valid and enforceable agreement for the
sale of the property, he cannot satisfy the statutory requirements of a vendee's lien.
B. Statute of Limitations Bars anv Vendee's Lien Theorv

Barraza's attempts to save the vendee's lien theory from being barred by a limitations
period highlight the fundamental errors with his argument that an invalid, unenforceable contract
can give rise to a vendee's lien: namely, if his theory were adopted, a vendee's lien would
effectively circumvent the statute of frauds.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION
TO BARRAZA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4

000039

In this matter, Barraza argues that there are two possible "agreements" that give rise to

his vendee's lien. First, the invalid and unenforceable written agreement for the purchase and
sale of the property (five year limitations period), and second, the oral modification of that
written agreement, which provided for a refund of the money paid, if and when Juan Cuevas sold
the property to a third party (four year limitations period). He then argues that his cause of
action for the vendee' s lien does not accrue until his cause of action for breach of either of these
contracts accrued. For the reasons that follow, Barraza's attempts to borrow the accrual dates
from the causes of action for breach of either of these alleged agreements is misplaced and does
not provide an accrual date on his vendee's lien.
Barraza cannot borrow the accrual date for breach of the alleged written agreement
because, as discussed at length herein, the alleged v.rritten agreement is void for failure to satisfy
the statute of frauds. As Barraza correctly notes, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues
upon default or breach of the contract. However, if the contract is void, then there can never be
an event of default or breach of that void contract: Barraza cannot "borrow' the date of accrual
from a cause of action that does not exist; this Court cannot pretend that a breach of a void
contract could exist in order to create an accrual date for a vendee's lien. Accordingly, the void
and unenforceable VvTi.tten agreement cannot be the underlying contract by which the limitations
period on Barraza's alleged vendee's lien claim is measured.
The second alleged contract, the oral modification to the written agreement, is equally
problematic.

First and foremost, if a written contract is void and unenforceable, an oral

modification to that void contract is a legal nullity. Alternatively, assuming the alleged oral
modification could stand alone as an independent contract, it is not the type of contract that gives

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION
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rise to a vendee's lien. The vendee's lien statute provides that money be paid pursuant to a
contract for the sale of real property. The alleged oral modification was not a contract for the
sale of real property; it was an agreement for the payment of $20,000.00 upon the vendor's sale
of the property to a third party.

On its face, this type of agreement does not meet the

requirements of a vendee's lien. Accordingly, breach of an alleged oral contract that does not

give rise to a vendee's lien cannot establish the accrual of a cause of action for a vendee's lien.
In his effort to save the alleged vendee's lien from being time barred, Barraza improperly
combines contracts and theories. While the limitations period for a vendee's lien runs concurrent
-with the underlying contract that gives rise to the vendee 's lien, such rule cannot apply when
there is no underlying contract. Similarly, Barraza canI1ot look to a contract which does not give
rise to a vendee's lien and borrow the accrual date for breach of that contract to save a vendee's
lien. Because Barraza cannot point to a valid, enforceable contract that gives rise to his vendee' s
lien, he cannot borrow the accrual date for breach of any contract to save his claim for a vendee' s
lien.

Accordingly, as set forth in Cuevas's opening brief, even if this Court concludes that

Barraza can have lien rights in the absence of a valid agreement for the sale of real property, then
such lien rights arise, and a cause of action accrues, at the time the money was paid. Under the

undisputed facts of this case, such limitations period ran on January 5, 2005, approximately four
and a half (4 Y2) years before the present lawsuit was filed. Barraza's vendee's lien, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations.

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND OPPOSITION
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Ill.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Wilfrido respectfully requests that this Court enter an order
granting his motion for summary judgment and denying Barraza's motion for summary
judgment.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2012.

RAINEY LAW OFFICE

72-C 4 ·;
Rebecca A. Rainey - of the
Attorney for Plaintiff

<
firmQ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of August 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
OPPOSITION TO BARRAZA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to be served by the
method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

Robert Ward

HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 E. 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, ID 83647

( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered

( ) Overnight Mail
~csimile

Facsimile: (208) 587-3144

Rebecca A. Rainey
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discussions. So that's ob
sly gone on.
What it appears in this case is, from
my -- at least from what I've seen at this stage
of the proceeding is that Mr. Juan Cuevas and
Yrene Baez had been engaged in negotiate -- in
contractual relations and/or activities with both
of these Individuals on this property. So now
that they're here in conflict, I have to plug in
the rules of law to determine who stands in
priority with this property. And I've indicated
at this stage it's up to Mr. Barraza to overcome
the legal presumption that Wilfrido was the owner
of the property.
By doing so, the first step is
demonstrating a legally recognizable claim to the
property. I believe the standard is by evidence
that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing.
But -- and that's more applicable at trial than in
the present instance, because we're in summary
judgment So there needs to be a genuine issue of
fact in that regard.
All right. There is a number of facts
that were presented in this case on behalf of
Mr. Barraza. It is sufficient to note that
Mr. Barraza contends -- and so I'm looking at
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94

1 these fac
a light most favorable to hlm -2 that Juan Manuel Cuevas sold the real property
3 commonly known as 29452 Pearl Road in Parma,
4 Idaho, and it was pursuant to a written contract.
5
Now, the written contract appears to be
6 in the fonn of the English document, but there's
7 also three documents that have been presented in
8 the record. One referred to as an English
9 document, a Spanish document, and then there's
10 also a lien. That on May 6th, 2002, Mr. Barraza,
11 the defendant, recorded a lien with the Canyon
12 County recorder's office against the real
13 property.
14
Now, I'll note. The lien states that
15 it is for $20,000 reimbursement due Mr. Barraza
16 from Juan and Yrene. But Mr. Barraza has
17 testified that the lien was filed because
18 Juan Manuel Cuevas failed to transfer title on the
19 property to him. So there's an acknowledgement
20 there that Juan never conveyed title of the
21 property, or Juan and Yrene never conveyed title
22 of the property to Mr. Barraza.
23
I want to talk first about the lien.
24 45-501 et sequitur of Idaho Code are not
25 applicable to establish a llen for what amounts

to, at best, a breach of contract, or at least
conversion. Unless a lien is authorized by
statute, consented to by the owner, imposed by a
court, or of the type commonly used in a
commercial transaction, it constitutes a
nonconsensual common law lien, and is invalid and
unenforceable. And this is also pursuant to
45-1702 Idaho Code. I think it's also followed up
by 1703 et sequitur.
The case of Browning -- I'm not sure of
this; I can't read my writing here -- versus, it
starts with a G, the second name, but it's 140
Idaho 598, 599 through 600. It's a court of
appeals decision from 2004. Also holds that.
If a lien is improperty filed as a
mechanics lien and the lien is not one otherwise
recognized by law, then the lien Is a
nonconsensual common law lien and is properly
subject to a court order removing the lien, Idaho
Code 45-1703. And also there's the case of
Maxwell versus Twin Falls canal Company, 49 Idaho

806.
But I want to talk about the Spanish
document. Now, that's in the record. But neither
the Spanish document or the English document,

1 based on what I've got before the court today,
2 satisfy the statute of frauds. Again, I've cited
3 9-503 Idaho Code. Holds that no estate or
4 interest In property can be created, granted,
5 assigned, et cetera, otherwise done by operation
6 of law or a conveyance, other than instrument in
7 writing subscribed by the party creating,
8 et cetera.
9
The statute of frauds requires the
10 writing contain an adequate legal description of
11 the property. I'm citing callles versus O'Neal,
12 147 Idaho 841 and other cases, Ray versus Frasun;
13 for example. And it's -- requires that the
14 description adequately describe the property so
15 that it is possible for someone to identify
16 exactly what property the seller is conveying to
17 the buyer. A description is adequate if the
18 quantity, identity, or boundaries of the property
19 can be determined from the face of the instrument,
20 or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which it
21 refers.
22
Now, the Spanish document does not
23 satisfy the statute of frauds, because it is not
24 subscribed by the party allegedly conveying the
25 property, nor does it contain an adequate legal
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' 1
2

3
4

nglish document
description of the property. '1
does not have the signature of Yrene Baez, and the
only reference to Yrene is that -- her name on the
document. It's spelled with an I, as opposed to a

5 Y for Yrene. I'm not sure that's significant, but
6

7
8
9

10

11
12
13
14
1s
16
17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

there's no signature by her. The English document
contains the street address of the property, but
under that Callies versus O'Neal case, 147 Idaho
841at848, the street address is insufficient and
does not satisfy the statute of frauds.
So here's where it -- this Is my
tentative ruling, but I'll indicate how I'll
proceed when we're done. It does not appear that
having first of all established this first part
dealing with the quitclaim deed, what it conveys
and where it places Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas, the
record is no -- there's insufficient record before
this court to show that there's any legally
recognizable claim to the property.
Certainly Mr. Barraza has a claim
against Wilfrido and Yrene -- I mean against Juan
and Yrene. That there's no legally recognizable
claim that Mr. Barraza has to the property that
can overcome this presumption, and Wilfrido is the
holder of the record title. So it would appear
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97

to require for an unjust enrichment recovery that
the plaintiff confers some benefit on the
defendant which would be unjust for the defendant
to retain.
Okay. The Issues and the arguments
here about the money that Mr. Barraza may have
paid to Mr. Juan Cuevas and Yrene, there's no
indication that any of that benefitted
Wilfrido Cuevas. On the issue of improvements to
the real property, there's no evidence before the
court to indicate that there -- that that has
occurred or that that has benefitted
Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas. That may be an area that -oh, I'll get back to this in a moment.
All right. So the -- here's my
tentative ruling, then. And I use that term -I've listened to your argumentsj rve done
preparation of it; I looked at what I saw to be
the issuesi I've made inquiries about what I saw
to be questions I had. They've been answered by
both sides. And I believe as I sit here that the
plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on both
the quiet title .and unjust enrichment claim.
Now, It is not lost on me that this
case is of significant issue and value to

1 then that sum
judgment should be granted on
2 the motion quieting title in the property to
3 Wilfrido Cuevas,
4
Regarding the unjust enrichment claim,
5 the elements that Mr. Barraza conferred a benefit
6 to Wilfrido Cuevas, that Wilfrido appreciated the
7 benefit, that it would be inequitable for Wilfrido
8 to accept the benefit without payment of the value
9 of such benefit. The measure of damages of unjust
10 enrichr;nent is.the value of the benefit bestowed
11 upon the defendant, which inequity would be unjust
12 to retain without recompense to the plaintiff.
13 Or, in this case, to Mr. Barraza.
14
I discussed earlier during arguments,
15 but in the case of Hayden Lake Fire Protection
16 District versus Alcorn, 141 Idaho 388 at 406, they
17 cite and review the Beco Construction case. And
18 they note: The court discussed a number of other
19 !'ciat;io cases involving unjust enrichment claims,
20
noted that in each of these cases, the
21 pl~intiff and defendant had a contractual
22 refa~ionship or a claim to real property which
23 were the underlying reasons for the unjust
24 enrichment or quasi-contract claims between the
25 parties. The court recognized that it continues
100
1 Mr. Barraza and Mr. Wilfrido Cuevas. That this is
2 probably their biggest asset that they would have,
3 this piece of property, and that they're not in
4 here because they think they're not entitled to
5 recovery. I think both sides are very sincere,
6 they believe they are right, and -- in this case.
7 And that they've already spent a lot of money and
8 their time and effort, as well as their expenses
9 to get this litigated.
10
So that's my tentative ruling. I'm
11 going to vacate the trial date. Now, if I have
12 misapplied the law to this or been unfair, in
13 terms of what you perceive the plaintiff's
14 argument to be, Mr. Ward, I will wait 30 days
15 before I issue -- I'm going to direct that Ms. -16 well, let me pursue it this way. You always have
17 the right to file a motion to reconsider. But
18 I've looked at the arguments of the plaintiff, and
19 I think that they raise those Issues in their
20 argument: The issue of the claims that could
21 exist against the property, the deeds -- or the
22 two written statements or agreements, and the
23 lien.
24
So I think that that's been addressed
25 in there. But I think if that has been

and
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OCT 1~ 2012
CANYON COUNTYCL~R~<
~CRAWFORO,DE?UtY

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR1CT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,
Case No. CV 09-8175
Plaintiff,
vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual, et
al.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT and DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

THIS MATTER, having come before the Court on July 20, 2012, pursuant to the Motion
for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff Wilfrido Cuevas ("Cuevas") and a cross-motion for
summary judgment filed by Defendant Bernardino Barraza ("Barraza"), both motions having
been fully brief by the parties, oral argument on the motions was held on October 3, 2012 with
Rebecca A Rainey appearing on behalf of Plaintiff and Robert Ward appearing on behalf of
Barraza. Based upon the argument of the parties and the pleadings on file with the Court, the
finding and conclusions rendered by the Court at such hearing, and good cause appearing
therefore,

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, and this does order, that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, and this does order, that Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED.
DATED this

\~ay of October, 2012.

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this j__2_ day of October 2012, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT and DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Robert Ward
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
340 E. 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, ID 83647
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Rebecca A. Rainey
Rainey Law Office
910 W. Main Street, Ste. 258
Boise, ID 83 702
Facsimile: (208) 473-2952

{)u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Ou.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) Facsimile

Clerk of the Court

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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~F.._.fA.k }~rD 9.M.
ROBERT WARD
HALL, FRIEDLY & WARD
Attorneys/or Appellant Bernardino Barraza
340 East 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-4412
Facsimile: (208) 587-3144
Email: Robert@hfwlaw.com
Idaho State Bar Number 4442

NOV 2 6 2012
CANYON COUNTY CLERK
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DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
Case No. CV09-8175

WILFRIDO CUEVAS, an individual,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Respondent,
VS.

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any), LIO BALDO GARZA, an
individual and spouse (if any); DOES I
THROUGH X, UNKNOWN CLAIMANTS
TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED
IN EXHIBIT "A", COMMONLY KNOWN
AS 29452 PEARL ROAD, PARMA, IDAHO,
Defendants/Appellant.
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, Wilfrido Cuevas, AND THE RESPONDENT'S
ATTORNEY, Rebecca A Rainey, Rainey Law Office, 910 W. Main Street, Suite 258, Boise,
Idaho, 83702, AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.
The above named Appellant, Bernardino Barraza, appeals against the abovenamed Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment entered in the
above-entitled action on the 15th day of October, 2012, Honorable Molly J. Husky presiding.
2.
That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
Order described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l)
I.A.R.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - I
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3.
A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then intends
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellant
from asserting other issues on appeal.
a.

4.
5.
judgment.

The district court erred in granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment and denying Defendant, Bernardino Barraza's, Motion for
Summary Judgment.

No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record.
No transcript is necessary since this case was decided in its entirety on summary

6.
The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.
a.

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on July 20, 2012

b.

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
filed on July 20, 2012

c.

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August 9, 2012

d.

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
and in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on
August 9, 2012

e.

Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and
Opposition to Barraza's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on August
17,2012

7.

Civil cases only. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme
Court: None.

8.

I certify:
a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set
out below: None.

b.

That the clerk of the district court has not been paid an estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcript since no transcript is requested.

c.

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d.

That all appellate filing fees have been paid.

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2
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e.

DATED THIS

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

~. \ day of November, 2012.

Attorneys for the Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that upon the

c2i

day of November, 2012, I caused to be served a

true and correct copy of Notice of Appeal by the method indicated below, addressed to the following:
/~

REBECCA A. RAINEY
RAINEY LAW OFFICE
910 W. MAIN STREET, SUITE 258
BOISE, ID 83702
FAX: (208) 473-2952

NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3
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WILFRIDO CUEVAS,

CANYON COUNTY CLER!<
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

)

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any),

ORDER AUGMENTING APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 40516-2012
Canyon County Docket No. 2009-817 5

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant,

)

and
LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and
spouse (if any), DOES I through X, unknown
claimants to the real property described in
exhibit "A", commonly known as 29452 Pearl
Road, Parma, Idaho,
Defendants.
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A Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript was filed May 3, 2011, in appeal No.
38493, Cuevas v. Barraza; therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that the Appeal Record in this case shall be
AUGMENTED to include the Court File, Reporter's Transcript, and Clerk's Record filed in prior
appeal No. 38493.
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11
11
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IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall prepare and file a
LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD with this Court, which shall contain the documents requested in the
Notice of Appeal, together with a copy of this Order, but shall not duplicate any document included

11
11

h

II11

in the Clerk's Record filed in prior appeal No. 38493. The LIMITED CLERK'S RECORD shall be

II

filed with this Court after settlement.
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DATED this

£qtA day of November, 2012.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho
!f~LL
E -P.M.
D
.M.
DEC 0 7 2012
WILFRIDO CUEVAS,

CANYON COUNTY CLERK
T RANDALL, DEPUTY

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)
)

v.

)
)

BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any),

)
)

Supreme Court Docket No. 40516-2012
Canyon County Docket No. 2009-8175

)

I

Defendant-Appellant,

I

I

ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT
COURT

and

)
)
)
)

LIOBALDO GARZA, an individual and
spouse (if any), DOES I through X, unknown
claimants to the real property described in
exhibit "A", conunonly known as 29452 Pearl
Road, Parma, Idaho,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

This appeal is from the District Court's ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT and DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT filed October 15, 2012. It appears that a final judgment set forth on a
separate document, as required by Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54(a) and 58(a), has yet to be
entered. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1l(a), 13.3, and
l 7(e)(2), the above-entitled matter be, and hereby is, REMANDED to the District Court and
proceedings in this appeal shall be SUSPENDED to allow for the entry of a final judgment, without
analysis or a record of prior proceedings. Upon entry of the final judgment by the District Court,
the District Court Clerk is directed to transmit a certified copy of the judgment to this Court at
which time this appeal shall proceed.

ORDER REMANDING TO DISTRICT COURT- Docket No. 40516-2012
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DATED this

~ft

day of December, 2012.
For the Supreme Court

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
District Court Judge
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COUNTY
\{_)..~DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON
WILBRIDIO CUEVAS, an individual,
CASE NO. CV09-8175

Petitioner,

JUDGMENT

vs.
BERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual,
et al,
Res ondent.

The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
Dated this

\2-~

day of December, 2012.

District Judge

JUDGMENT PAGE-1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

The undersigned certifies that on j
day of December, 2012, s/he served a true and
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the
manner described:
•

upon counsel for plaintiff:
Rebecca Ann Rainey
RAINEY LAW OFFICE
910 W Main St, Ste 258
Boise, ID 83702-5750

•

upon counsel for defendant:
Robert Ward
HALL FRIEDLY & WARD
340 E. 2nd North Street
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above.

CHRIS YAMAMOTO,
Clerk of the Court

By:_k----'-Vi)_'J1t_,'-1

Deputy Clerk of the Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsBERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
And spouse (if any),
Defendant-Appellant,
And
LIOBALDO GARZA, etal.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-08175*C
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the following
is being sent as an exhibit:

NONE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this ----'-"""......___ day of February, 2013.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
in
the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBIT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsBERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
and spouse (if any),
Defendant-Appellant,

And
LIOBALDO GARZA, etal.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
)

Case No. CV-09-08175*C
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and
foregoing Record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my
direction as, and is a true, full correct Limited Record of the pleadings and documents
requested.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this__;__;_ day of February, 2013.
CHRISYAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
~~~~,4'~~ the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

WILFRIDO CUEVAS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsBERNARDINO BARRAZA, an individual
And spouse (if any),
Defendant-Appellant,
And
LI OBALDO GARZA, etal.,
Defendants.

Supreme Court No. 40516-2012
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the
Clerk's Limited Record to the attorney of record to each party as follows:

Robert Ward, HALL, FRIEDLY &WARD
Rebecca A. Rainey, RAINEY LAW OFFICE

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this-~- day of February, 2013.
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District
Court of the Third Judicial
District of the State of Idaho,
U.H"''""'-'-'" the County of Canyon.
By:
Deputy
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

000060

